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NOTES
The Kentucky Religious Freedom Act:
Neither a Savior for the Free Exercise of Religion Nor a
Monstrous Threat to Civil Rights
Jennifer A. Pekmani
INTRODUCTION
Few legal issues were more contentious in Kentucky in 2013 than the
Legislature's enactment of Kentucky Revised Statutes (hereinafter KRS) section
446.350, popularly known as the Religious Freedom Act.2 The statute became law
in a storm of controversy and garnered both state and national media attention.
The Kentucky State House and Senate passed KRS section 446.350 by an
overwhelming override of Governor Beshear's veto. Representative Bob Damron
sponsored HB 279, which later became KRS section 446.350, following the
Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Gingerich v. Commonwealth.' That case
involved the prosecution of several members of the Amish faith who failed to
comply with a law that required drivers of slow-moving' vehicles to place a
fluorescent triangle on the vehicle in order to warn fellow drivers of their low
speed.4 The Kentucky Supreme Court held that when the state government's
actions were challenged on the basis that they infringed upon one's religious rights,
the court would apply a rational basis standard so long as the government's action
concerned "the health, safety, and welfare" of the people and was generally
applicable to all citizens.
5
In Part I, this Note will discuss the history of religious freedom legislation in
both the federal government and other state governments, illuminating the reasons
behind the recent actions of the Kentucky Legislature. Furthermore, in Part II, this
Note will examine the specific circumstances that spurred Kentucky to follow at
least sixteen other states and the federal government in passing religious freedom
'University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. Candidate May 2015.
2 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West Supp. 2013); Jack Brammer & Beth Musgrave,
Kentucky's Religious Freedom Bill Divided Politicians, Public, Ministers, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.kentucky.com/2013/03/30/2580631/kentuckys-religious-
freedom-bill.html.
Brammer &Musgrave, supra note 2.
Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Ky. 2012).
Id. at 844.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
legislation. In Part III, this Note will use the history of such legislation to argue
that the Kentucky Religious Freedom Act most likely will not drastically change
the status of religious freedom in Kentucky. Because the Kentucky Religious
Freedom Act mirrors other state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (hereinafter
RFRAs), and because the legislature's passage of the bill caused an abundance of
controversy, this Note suggests two different solutions to two potential
consequences of the legislation. First, the Kentucky legislature should clearly define
what "substantial burden" means as it is used in KRS section 446.350 so that
Kentucky courts will know whether to apply the term broadly or narrowly when
plaintiffs bring claims under the Act. Second, the Kentucky legislature should add a
carve-out to the statute that stipulates that it does not in any way diminish the civil
rights protections provided for under local ordinances and state law. These changes
will ensure the intended judicial application of the law and quell the concerns of
minority groups who worry that the law could serve as a shield for discrimination
under the guise of religious belief.
I. HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM LEGISLATION
A. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions and the Federal RFRA
The standard of review that the United States Supreme Court applies to First
Amendment questions regarding the free exercise of religion has changed over
time. In 1990, the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith6 to
severely limit the use of the "compelling interest" strict scrutiny standard of review
against the government spurred legislative action in the United States Congress as
well as in many state legislatures.
Before Smith, there were cases in which the Court applied a strict standard of
review by requiring the government to have a compelling interest when infringing
on a citizen's freedom to exercise his or her religion. In 1963, the United States
Supreme Court applied the "compelling interest" standard of review in Sherbert v.
Verner.7 This case is one of the most cited and most illustrative examples of the
Court applying the strict scrutiny test prior to its decision in Smith. The case
concerned a South Carolina woman who was a member of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church.' The appellant's employer fired her because she could not work
on Saturday, her faith's Sabbath day.9 When the appellant applied for
unemployment benefits, South Carolina's Employment Security Commission
denied her request. The Commission found that the appellant was ineligible to
6 494 U.S. 872, 882-84 (1990).
7 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
' Id. at 399.
9 Id. at 399-400 (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 41-35-120(5)(a) (2012).
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receive benefits because she "fail[ed], without good cause, to accept 'suitable work
when offered ... by the employment office or the employer.'"'"
Upon these facts, the Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny standard of
review requiring a compelling state interest in cases where the complainant accused
the government of impeding his or her freedom of religion.1" The Court first asked
if the government's action impeded the appellant's religion. The Court found that
it was "clear" that the government's denial of unemployment benefits burdened the
appellant's religion-she was ineligible for unemployment aid because of her
religion, and the denial of these benefits would put pressure on her to put aside her
religious beliefs in order to ensure her economic stability.' 2 After finding that the
government's actions burdened the appellant's exercise of her religion, the Court
then analyzed the State's goals to determine if the State had a compelling interest
that would justify the infringement. South Carolina claimed that its interest was in
preventing fraudulent claims by individuals who feigned religious observance that
would not allow them to work on Saturday, as this practice could deplete the
unemployment fund.' 3 The Court did not find this interest compelling and,
consequently, found in favor of the appellant.' 4
In 1990, almost thirty years after its decision in Sherbert, the Supreme Court in
Employment Division v. Smith severely limited the use of the compelling interest
standard of review and instead embraced a presumption of constitutionality in favor
of the government. In Smith, the Supreme Court limited the applicability of the
Sherbert decision.'" Smith involved two men whose private employer fired them
because they used peyote, a hallucinogenic substance, in a religious ceremony at
their Native American Church. 6 The State of Oregon denied the appellees'
employment benefits because they had been fired for "work-related 'misconduct.""' 7
In its decision, the Court stated that it had never before found that an individual's
religious beliefs and practices could exempt him or her from having to follow a
valid, generally applicable law that prohibits a specific action that the State is
perfectly within its bounds to regulate."8 The State of Oregon did in fact prohibit
the use of peyote for all of its citizens.' 9 Therefore, the Court held that the
compelling interest test would not apply to challenges to state or federal laws that
were neutral and generally applicable to all citizens, even if they may interfere with
some citizens' religion.
20
10 Id. at 401.
n See id. at 406-07.
12 Id. at 403-04.
13 Id. at 407.
14 Id. at 407-09.
1s Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-85 (1990).
16 Id. at 874.
17 Id.
"Id. at 878-79.
19 Id. at 876.
20 See id. at 878-79.
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Why did the Supreme Court almost entirely abandon the compelling interest
standard of review? The Court reasoned that wide use of the compelling interest
test as the standard of review could result in "anarchy" because it could lead to
"constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligation of almost every
conceivable kind ... ."" The Court noted that the potential for anarchy and
confusion would only increase as the nation's religious diversity increased. 22 In
writing for the majority, Justice Scalia emphasized that it is a slippery slope to
embrace a standard so stringent upon the government that it would lead to wide
exemptions from generally applicable laws.23 It was the Court's concern about this
slippery slope that led it to embrace the stance that one's right to freely exercise
one's religion does not relieve one of the responsibility to follow neutral and
generally applicable laws, even if such laws may infringe upon one's exercise of
religion.
24
Fearing a plethora of unending religious exemptions, the Court left only three
possible avenues through which the courts may apply the compelling interest strict
standard of review against the government in a free exercise claim. First, courts will
still apply the compelling interest test when the government passes a law that
specifically targets religious conduct.2 Second, the compelling interest standard
will apply to claims that involve "hybrid" constitutional violations, meaning that the
government's actions have infringed not only upon the protections guaranteed by
the Free Exercise Clause but also upon another constitutionally guaranteed
protection, such as the freedom of press.26 Lastly, courts will use the compelling
interest test when there is a law of general applicability and a governmental entity
has a system in place for granting exemptions to that law, but the governmental
entity declines to apply this system to a case of "religious hardship" under the Free
Exercise Clause.
2 7
Only three years after the Court decided Smith, Congress passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993. The bill was introduced in the Senate
through a bipartisan effort.28  Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy and
Republican Senator Orrin Hatch presented the bill in the Senate.29 In 2013, twenty
years later, this same spirit of bipartisanship was evident in the Kentucky
21 Id. at 888.
22 Id.
' See id.
24 Id. at 879.
25 See id. at 877; Gary S. Gildin, A Blessing in Disguise: Protecting Minority Faiths Through State
Rehlious Freedom Non-Restoration Acts, 23 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 411, 415 (2000).
26 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82; Gildin, supra note 25, at 415.
27 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)); Gildin, supra note 25,
at 415-16.
2 Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State Courts,
10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 235, 237 & nn.15-16 (1998).
29 id.
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legislature's passage of the Religious Freedom Act.3" The federal statute
commanded that neither state governments nor the federal government could
significantly burden one's religious freedom, even if a law was generally applicable
to all citizens.31 Congress enacted RFRA in "direct" response to the Court's
opinion in Smith.32 In the statute, Congress stated that the Smith opinion
"virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion."33 Congress also
explicitly identified that the purpose of the statute was "to restore the compelling
interest test" that the Supreme Court had used in prior cases including Sherbert
and to ensure the compelling interest standard's "application in all cases where free
exercise of religion is substantially burdened."34 Despite the bipartisan enthusiasm
for RFRA, Congress' attempt to restore the standard of review of strict scrutiny in
free exercise cases was quashed by the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne
v. Flores.
35
In the 1997 case, Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court ruled that RFRA was
unconstitutional as applied to the states because Congress acted beyond its
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment.36 The case involved St. Peter
Catholic Church in Boerne, Texas.37 The church was outgrowing its original
structure, and the Archbishop of San Antonio approved the building's renovation.38
The Archbishop applied for a building permit for the renovations, but local zoning
authorities denied his request because of a local ordinance concerning the
preservation of historic landmarks and districts. 39 Local officials argued the church
was in a historic district.40 The Archbishop challenged the local authorities'
decision under various claims including RFRA.
After hearing the arguments of both parties, the Supreme Court issued an
opinion in which it acknowledged that Congress passed RFRA in "direct response"
to Smith.4 Both the judicial branch and the legislature were unabashedly clear
about the tension that Smith caused between them. While the Court
acknowledged Congress' constitutionally granted power to enforce the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it ruled that the power to enforce is "not the power to
30 Beth Musgrave & Jack Brammer, Kentucky Legislature Overrides Governor's Veto of'Regious
Freedorn'Bill, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.kentucky.com/2013/03/
26/2575323kentucky-house-votes-to-override.html.
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1994).
32 Gildin, supra note 25, at 421.
33 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
31 Id. at § 2000bb(b)(1).
3 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997).
31 Id. at 536.
37 Id. at 511-12.
381 Id. at 512.
39 Id.
4 Id.
41 Id.
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determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."42 The Supreme Court
classified Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment as remedial not
substantive.43 The Court found RFRA's "[siweeping coverage ensure[d] its
intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official
actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter."44 Due to
RFRA's broad nature and effect on even the lowest levels of government, the
Supreme Court concluded that Congress had overstepped its bounds and infringed
upon the power given to the states.4" Furthermore, the Court contended that
Congress had infringed upon the separation of powers because Congress had
infringed upon the power of the judiciary to "say what the law is."46 According to
the Supreme Court, RFRA "contradict[ed] vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal balance."4 ' The Court declared the statute
unconstitutional.
41
B. States' 'Mini RFRAs"
The Supreme Court's decision in Boerne spurred an abundance of legislative
action at the state level to provide greater protection for the free exercise of
religion. Various state legislatures passed statutes that established a strict scrutiny
standard of review in state courts.49 Although sixteen states responded to the
controversy at the federal level between the Supreme Court and Congress involving
the Free Exercise Clause by adopting state RFRAs, initially Kentucky was not one
of them."° The federal government's squabble over the Free Exercise Clause in the
late Twentieth Century did not serve as the impetus for Kentucky's actions.
s
5
Instead, it was the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in which the state's highest
court embraced the United States Supreme Court decision in Smith that led the
State's legislative branch to act in 2013.52 Despite its different impetus to action,
Kentucky's Religious Freedom Act is strikingly similar to RFRAs of other states.
Most of these states passed these statutes within five years of the United States
.Supreme Court's decision in Boerne.3 Like Kentucky, all of the states that have
42 Id. at 519.
4 Id. at 520.
4Id. at 532.
45 See id. at 533-35.
4' Id. at 536.47 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
48 Id.
41 Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L.
REV. 466, 474-76 (2010).
50 Brammer & Musgrave, supra note 2.
5' Beth MI\Lgrave, Kentucky House Passes 'Religious Freedom' Bill That Now Goes to Senate,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.kentucky.com/2013/03/01/2537796/
kentucky-house-passes-religious.html.
52 Brammer & Musgrave, supra note 2.
" Lund, supra note 49, at 477.
[Vol. 103
KENTUCKY RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
passed a state RFRA require that state courts apply the compelling interest test for
the standard of review. 4 Most of them also require that the plaintiff establish that
the government's actions substantially burdened his or her freedom of religion.5 5 A
few of the states that have passed a state RFRA have a lower threshold that
requires the plaintiff to show that the state merely burdened or imposed restrictions
on one's exercise of religion in order to trigger the strict standard of review.
5 6
Though strikingly similar to the RFRA that Congress passed in 1993, state
RFRAs have not been widely effective and have often failed to provide greater
protection for religious freedoms.57 Why have these state statutes had such a
lackluster and ineffective presence since their passage? In his article concerning the
effectiveness of state RFRAs, constitutional law scholar, Christopher Lund cites a
number of reasons.5 ' To start, Lund looks beyond state RFRAs' statutory language
that always stipulates that the state's judiciary utilize the compelling interest test
found in earlier Supreme Court cases like Sherbert.9 The first reason for state
RFRAs' ineffectiveness is that there has been scant litigation related to the statutes
in these states.6° Five of the sixteen states that passed RFRAs have seen only eleven
cases combined, and, more importantly, another four of the sixteen states have not
recorded even one RFRA decision.6 Lund notes that the litigation at the state level
is "surprisingly light."62 Furthermore, in the state RFRA claims that have been
successfully litigated, plaintiffs have rarely been victorious. 63 Shockingly, over half
of the states that passed state RFRAs report zero litigated wins for plaintiffs who
sued under the statute.
61
Though the statistics are telling and significant, the most important reason for
state RFRAs' uninspiring effect appears to be that some state courts have continued
to apply the Smith standard even though the legislatures have passed RFRA
statutes that establish the standard of review as strict scrutiny. 6s Many state courts
have interpreted their respective state RFRAs in such a way that the state RFRAs
"provide less protection than the constitutional clauses they were meant to
augment."66 This method of judicial interpretation serves to completely quash the
very legislative intention of state RFRAs and to remove the heightened protection
for religious exercise.
"4 Id. at 477-78.
55 Id.
56 See id.
17 Id. at 467-69, 475-76.
58 Id. at 479-87.
51 See id. at 479.
6' Id. at 479-80.
61 Id.
61 Id. at 480.
63 Id. at 481-82.
64 Id. at 482.
65 Id. at 485-89.
66 Id. at 485.
'2014-2015]
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In his article, Lund points to the courts of several states, including Connecticut,
to illustrate the significant consequences that judicial interpretation can have on a
state's RFRA statute.67 In Connecticut, the state legislature passed one of the most
stringent state RFRAs to protect one's freedom to exercise his or her religion.6"
Connecticut's statute lowered the threshold to require that plaintiffs only show that
the state has "burdened" - not "substantially burdened" - the exercise of their
religion.69 Also, the Connecticut statute does not contain any carve-outs that
stipulate certain areas of the law where the statute will not apply.7" According to its
language, the statute applies across the board. Despite this statutory language,
however, Connecticut courts have continually found that the state's RFRA
incorporates the lessened protections of Smith and "nothing more."71 Since
Kentucky's Religious Freedom Act became law in June 2013, it is still too early to
tell how Kentucky courts will interpret the statute, but it is certainly possible that
the courts may choose to interpret the statute in such a manner that effectively
nullifies the statutory intent to heighten the standard of review to strict scrutiny.
11. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE KENTUCKY RFRA
A. Gingerich v. Commonwealth
The rise of the issue of the free exercise of religion to the forefront of
Kentucky's political landscape in 2013 began with the Kentucky Supreme Court's
decision in Gingerich v. Commonwealth. The appellants in that case were Amish
and utilized a horse and buggy as their transportation.7 2 KRS section 189.820
required slow moving vehicles, including horse and buggies, to display a slow-
moving vehicle symbol when traveling on public highways, but the appellants
refused to display the symbol in direct violation of the statute.73 The slow-moving
vehicle emblem is a reflective yellow and orange triangle with a red border.74 The
appellants argued that the slow-moving vehicle emblem's color and shape offended
their religious beliefs because the Amish faith commands them to be plain and does
not accept the symbol of the trinity.75 The Kentucky statute was generally
applicable to all slow moving vehicles, and the Kentucky legislature passed the
statute to promote public safety on Kentucky's public highways.76
67 See id. at 485-87.
68 Id. at 485 & n.116 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(a) (West 2005)).
6 See id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 486.
7 Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Ky. 2012).
7' Id. at 837.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 844.
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In Gingerich, the Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly followed the precedent of
the United States Supreme Court and established the rational basis standard of
review in cases involving laws that concern the "health, safety, and welfare" of the
people and that are generally applicable to all citizens.77 The Kentucky Supreme
Court rejected the use of the compelling interest strict scrutiny standard of review.78
Ultimately, the court found that the Kentucky legislature passed KRS section
189.820, the statute at issue, in order to protect citizens traveling on the highway
and did not seek to target religious practices.79 As the statute protected the safety
of, and was equally applicable to, all Kentucky citizens, the court applied the
rational basis standard of review instead of the compelling interest strict scrutiny
standard of review. 
8
B. HB279
In response to Gingerich, Representative Bob Damron sponsored House Bill
279.1 Representative Damron stated that Kentucky needed the legislation due to
the Kentucky Supreme Court's decisions on religious freedom. 2 The bill passed the
House with a vote of 82-7 and the Senate with a vote of 29-6.83 Surprisingly,
Damron stated that the successful passage of HB 279 "wouldn't ... bring landmark
change in Kentucky." 4 This comment is significant given the tremendous reaction
and opposition by many political groups and some politicians to HB 279. Damron
stated that the benign purpose of HB 279 was to "reinforce that somebody's basic
right of religious expression is paramount and the government has to have a
compelling interest to override that.""5 One legislator in opposition to the bill, state
Representative Darryl Owen, argued that "the U.S. and Kentucky [C]onstitutions
already protect religious freedom" and that religious freedom was not under attack
or in jeopardy.8 6
The discontent over HB 279 in the General Assembly led legislators and
outside interest groups to pressure Governor Beshear to veto the bill. After much
77 Id.
" See id. at 841-44.
71 Id. at 837.
80 Id. at 844.
81 Musgrave, supra note 51.
82 Id.
83 Ronnie Ellis, 'Religious Freedom' Bill Vetoed by Beshear, RICHMOND REGISTER (Mar. 22,
2013, 9:51 PM), http://www.richmondregister.com/news/local-news/artide_e47c9802-d2dl-5dbf-886
6-e84511b68c5a.html.
14 Gov. Beshear Vetoes Religious Freedom Bill in Ky., HERALD-DISPATCH (Mar. 22, 2013, 7:30
PM), http://www.herald-dispatch.comL/news/briefs/x622855730/Gov-Beshear-vetoes-religious-freedom
-bill-in-Ky.
85 Id.
86 Tom Loftus, Ky. Legislature Overrides Veto of'Religious Freedom'Bill, USA TODAY (Mar. 26,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/26/kentucky-legislature-overrides-
religious-freedom-veto/2023489.
2014- 201,]
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consideration and input from these outside groups, Beshear decided to veto the
legislation.87 Beshear stated that he was concerned that the bill would lead to costly
litigation and jeopardize citizens' civil rights. 8 He cited the "vague language" of the
statute as the root of his concerns. 9 Further, Beshear expressed apprehension
because he believed the statute lent itself to overly broad application, and he
ultimately concluded that HB 279 "while well intended, is undermined by
precarious legal wording."" HB 279 became law after both houses overrode the
Governor's veto by a significant majority. 91
C. Public Debate Over HB 279
According to one Lexington Herald-Leader article, in proposing HB 279,
Representative Damron sponsored "the most contentious issue" in the 2013
General Assembly. 92 Kentucky legislators faced pressure from groups both in favor
of and opposed to the Religious Freedom Act. Many groups, including the
Kentucky ACLU and the Kentucky Human Rights
Commission, opposed HB 279 and consequently urged Governor Beshear to
veto the legislation. The ACLU stated in a press release that it believed that the
Kentucky Religious Freedom Act would "undermine" civil rights legislation.93 The
ACLU advocated for the inclusion of explicit protections for civil rights in the
Act.94 The organization argued that without "specific protections . . . a religious
individual could claim an exemption from any law or policy that prohibits
discrimination-leaving racial minorities, women, LGBT people and others
without adequate protections."' The ACLU expressed concern in particular for the
"LGBT Fairness" legislation in "Louisville, Lexington, Covington, and Vicco,
Kentucky."96 The Kentucky Civil Rights Commission also campaigned against HB
279 because it feared that the legislation's language was too broad and would allow
religious organizations to discriminate against those who are protected by the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act under the guise of sincere religious belief.97 The
"7 Press Release, Governor Steve Beshear's Commc'ns Office, Governor Beshear Vetoes House Bill
279 (Mar. 22, 2013), available at http://migration.kentucky.gov/newsroom/governor/20130322hb279
.htm.
88 Id.
89 Id.
9 Id.
91 Brammer &Musgrave, supra note 2.
92 Id.
9' Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of Ky. Statement on the Passage of HB279 (Mar. 11, 2013),
available at https://www.acu.org/lgbt-rights-racial-justice-religion-befief-womens-rights/adu-kentucky
-statement-passage-hb279.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
9' See Press Release, Ky. Comm'n on Human Rights, KY Human Rights Commission Concerned
House Bill 279 Would Have Unintended Consequence of Jeopardizing Civil Rights Enforcement (Mar.
21, 2013), available at http://migration.kentucky.gov/newsroorn/kchr/ky+human+rights+commission
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Commission, like the Kentucky ACLU, advocated for an amendment to the bill
that would unequivocally give the state government and local governments the
ability to still "fully enforce" any civil rights legislation even if it conflicted with the
Religious Freedom Act.9"
Prominent civil rights groups were not the only influential actors to publically
oppose HB 279; the mayor of Kentucky's largest city also publically criticized the
legislation as well. Louisville Mayor Greg Fischer wrote to Governor Beshear
stating that he believed HB 279 would cause Louisville and the entire state of
Kentucky to move "backwards."99 Mayor Fischer stated that he fears the legislation
will "hurt[] the very ... freedom it is intended to defend" because, in his opinion,
the Kentucky Religious Freedom Act "creates more questions than answers for the
administration of government, the application of the law, and the protection of civil
rights for all... citizens." 00 The Mayor expressed his belief that Kentucky did not
need the legislation to protect the freedom of religion within the state, and
especially his city of Louisville, because Kentucky has "plenty of laws and a
Constitution . . . that provide . . . ample protections-no matter [one's] faith,
[one's] profession, or [one's] other rights and traits as [a] human being[]."1 °1
While there was vehement opposition to HB 279, there was also strong support
for the bill from religious and family organizations across the state. A member of
the Family Foundation of Kentucky, a Christian group, stated that the bill was a
"'shield for people of faith, not a sword."'10 2 Religious leaders rose to the defense of
HB 279 and attempted to quash concerns about any possible negative ramifications
of the legislation. The Executive Director of the Kentucky Baptist Convention,
Paul Chitwood, stated that contrary to the view of HB 279's opponents, the bill
actually "protects against discrimination" and "religious freedom isn't to be
feared." 103 The Kentucky Baptist Convention President, Dan Summerlin, believed
that the Kentucky Religious Freedom Act would have an important impact on the
Commonwealth, as he viewed the bill as "vital legislation for the protection and the
welfare of. . . society."10 4 A Catholic Archbishop in Louisville argued that the
federal Health and Human Services birth control mandate was "just one of a
+concerned+about+unintended+consequences+of+house+bill+279.htm.
98 Id.
99 Thomas McAdam, Kentucky Legislature Overturns Governor's Veto of Religious Freedom Act,
EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/artide/12-kentucky-legislature-
overturns-governor-s-veto-of-religious-freedom-act.
10 Phillip M. Bailey, Louisville Mayor Greg Fischer Comes Out Against 'Religious Freedom' Bill,
WFPL NEWS (Mar. 19, 2013, 4:12 PM), http://wfpl.org/post/louisville-mayor-greg-fischer-comes-
out-against-religious-freedom-bill.
101 Id.
102 Joan Frawley Desmond, Lessons from Bruising Passage of Kentucky Religious-Freedom Bill,
NAT'L CATHOLIC REGISTER (Apr. 24, 2013, 4:56 AM) (quoting Kent Ostrander of the Family
Foundation of Kentucky), http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/lessons-from-bruising-passage-of-
kentucky-religious-freedom-bill.
103 Todd Deaton, Ky. Lawmakers Override Religious Freedom Veto, BAPTIST PRESS (Mar. 27,
2013), http://www.bpnews.net/39958.104 Id.
2014 - 2oi51
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number of assaults on religious liberty" and that those in favor of the bill wanted to
ensure that "the Commonwealth of Kentucky ... provided the same protections as
RFRA."0 s National tensions over religious freedom following the passage of the
Affordable Care Act likely spurred religious groups to believe that Kentucky
needed additional legislation to protect the free exercise of religion." 6 Regardless of
what motivated them, religious groups from across a variety of sects joined together
in their support of the legislation.
Throughout much of 2013, HB 279 led to intense debate over the state of
religious freedom in Kentucky and the bill's possible implications for existing civil
rights legislation. Before HB 279 became law, both the state government and the
citizens of Kentucky engaged in a thoughtful dialogue about the possible positive
and negative impacts of the legislation.
III. CONSEQUENCES IN KENTUCKY
After much debate, HB 279 became KRS section 446.350. The statute reads
as follows:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's freedom of religion. The
right to act or refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious
belief may not be substantially burdened unless the government proves by clear
and convincing evidence that it has a compelling governmental interest in
infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least restrictive means
to further that interest. A "burden" shall include indirect burdens such as
withholding benefits, assessing penalties, or an exclusion from programs or access
to facilities.
1 7
Following the passage of KRS section 446.350, the Kentucky legislature would
be wise to (1) clearly define the meaning of the term "substantial burden" as it is
included in KRS section 446.350, and (2) consider amending the statute to include
a carve-out for civil rights legislation, which would effectively shield civil rights
from any encroachment by the Act. The first suggestion will make the courts'
adjudication of the statute more uniform and help plaintiffs predict the threshold
they must meet to challenge the government for "substantially" burdening their
exercise of religion under the statute. The second suggestion will help to allay the
concerns of those opposed to the legislation and ensure that it is not used as a
mechanism to infringe upon the civil rights of others.
1 Desmond, supra note 102.
106 Id.
107 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West Supp. 2013).
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A. The Need to Define Substantial Burden
An understanding of what exactly constitutes a "substantial [government]
burden" on an individual's free exercise of religion is imperative to a successful
claim under a state RFRA. That is the first hurdle that a plaintiff must overcome in
establishing a claim against the state. Eight out of the sixteen states that enacted
state RFRAs before Kentucky did not define substantial burden.'0° Kentucky has
joined that number because the state legislature failed to provide guidance for the
judicial" branch as to the exact parameters of what constitutes a substantial
burden. °9 If the legislature were to explicitly define substantial burden, Kentucky
courts would know whether to apply the term broadly or narrowly.
The definition of substantial burden, whether statutory or court-created, can
make the plaintiffs burden greater or smaller; so, it is imperative to the success of
Kentucky's religious freedom legislation that courts know how to apply it.110 The
pre-Boerne federal circuit decisions collectively provide the best source for different
definitions of substantial burden. Among the various federal circuits, there were
four different definitions of the term."'
The first definition comes from the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,
which all defined the threshold requirement of substantial burden "as forbidding
what is required or requiring what is forbidden by central religious beliefs."' This
is a very narrow definition of substantial burden and would not be favorable for
Kentucky because it would create an almost impossible threshold for plaintiffs to
meet, and thus would thwart legislative intent.
The second definition comes from the Sixth Circuit, the federal circuit in
which Kentucky is located. The Sixth Circuit adopted only a slightly broader
definition of substantial burden."3 The Sixth Circuit's definition stated that the
test for substantial burden was "whether the religious practice burdened [by
government action] was 'essential' or 'fundamental.""14 This slightly broader
definition encompasses parts of religious exercise that may not be mandatory, but
are nonetheless central to one's religious practice."' While slightly broader, it
would still be incredibly limiting for Kentucky courts to apply in Religious
Freedom Act claims.
108 See Lund, supra note 49, at 477; see also James W. Wright, Jr., Note, Making State Religious
Freedom Restoration Amendments Effective, 61 ALA. L. REV. 425, 433 (2010).
0 Because the Kentucky RFRA does not specifically define or codify what exactly constitutes a
"substantial burden," it is presumably left to the judiciary to decide within the unclear terms of the
statute's language. See § 446.350.
110 Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification ofReligious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 565,578-79 (1999).
... See W. Cole Durham, Jr., State RFRAs and the Scope ofFree Exercise Protection, 32 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 665, 704-08 (1999).
112 Id. at 704-05.
"' Id. at 705.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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The third definition comes from the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, and
it involves a test that asks "whether governmental action compels believers 'to
refrain from religiously motivated conduct,' or whether it 'significantly inhibit[s] or
constrain[s] conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a [person's]
individual beliefs.'"' 1 6 This definition is much more flexible and allows more
plaintiffs to meet the substantial burden requirement. It also takes into account that
while the government action may not infringe upon a mandatory or essential
religious action, it may still significantly impact a person's practice of his or her
religion. This moderate definition would work well for Kentucky. It neither creates
an impossible standard that a plaintiff could never meet, nor does it remove any
threshold that makes this hurdle too easy for plaintiffs to satisfy. A plaintiff will
still have to show that the government is significantly infringing on his or her
religious practice," 7 and this definition is broad enough that it takes into account
religious actions that may not be mandatory or essential to the religion but are still
an important part of one's religious practice."
8
Lastly, the Second Circuit's very broad definition states that the government
has substantially burdened one's exercise of religion when it "'put[s] substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.'""' 9 This
definition is certainly more comprehensive and better than the narrowest
definitions, but it ultimately may be. too broad and imprecise. This definition
would not add much clarity to the already vague statutory language of KRS section
446.350.
The definition embraced by the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits would be
a helpful addition to KRS section 446.350 because it gives the courts guidance, and
it gives more plaintiffs an opportunity to meet the substantial burden requirement
in order to successfully bring a claim under the Religious Freedom Act. This is a
necessary addition to the statute in order to ensure that the courts carry out the
legislative intent of the statute and to prevent confusion for those who seek to bring
claims under the statute. As it is currently written, the statute does state that a
substantial burden can include "indirect burdens"; however, it only gives a few
examples of indirect burdens instead of establishing a narrow or broad definition of
the term substantial burden. 2 ° More clarity is needed to ensure that the statute is
effective and to ensure that the legislative intent behind the statute's passage
translates into its use in the Kentucky state court system.
116 Id. at 705-06.
See id. at 705-706 & n.132 (citing Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995)).
1 See id. at 706 & n.133 (citing Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996)).
9 Id. at 708.
120 Ky. REv. STAT. § 446.350 (West 2013).
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B. Civil Rights Carve-Out
Because Governor Beshear vetoed and many groups and politicians opposed
HB 279 for fear of its unintended consequences to civil rights, the Kentucky
legislature would be wise to include protection for civil rights legislation at the state
and local level. Many cities in Kentucky, including Louisville and Lexington, have
passed fairness ordinances in order to protect their citizens' civil rights. 2' In 1999,
Lexington passed its fairness ordinance that states, "It is the policy of the
Lexington Fayette Urban County Government to safeguard all individuals within
Fayette County from discrimination in employment, public accommodation, and
housing on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity."1 22 Opponents of HB
279 feared that religious individuals could nullify the local fairness ordinances of
Lexington and other Kentucky cities by discriminating against gay, lesbian, and
transgender individuals so long as the religious person has a "'sincerely held'
religious belief that homosexuality is immoral."112 3 Because of these legitimate
concerns, the Kentucky legislature should amend section 446.350 to include a
carve-out for civil rights legislation across the state.
Many states have included carve-outs in their RFRA statutes. 24 Carve-outs are
necessary because state RFRAs are "applicable to ANY government act or actor"
and therefore these well-intended and important statutes result in virtually
instantaneous conflict with state and local civil rights laws. 12' These carve-outs
serve to stipulate areas where a state's RFRA has no force at all or lessens its force
in a particular area of the law.'26 Texas has included a carve-out for civil rights
legislation in its state RFRA. 127 Texas' statutory carve-out states, "this chapter does
not establish or eliminate a defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution under a
federal or state civil rights law.' 2 If a version of this simple, yet effective, sentence
were included in Kentucky's Religious Freedom Act, it would allay the concerns of
many of the Act's opponents because Kentucky's civil rights legislation and local
ordinances on civil rights would remain separate from the Act and immune to its
effects.
When civil rights laws and state RFRAs come into conflict, courts must decide
which right trumps the other. This decision is certainly not an easy one. The
121 LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY, KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. II, § 2-33 (2014);
LOUISVILLE, KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. IX, ch. 92, §§ 92.04-.06 (2014).
122 LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY, KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. II, § 2-33 (2014).
123 Jack Brammer & Beth Musgrave, Rights Groups Urge Kentucky Gov. Beshear to Veto
Religious Freedom Bill, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.kentucky.com/
2013/03/11/2552117/rights-groups-urge-kentucky-gov.html.
124 Lund, supra note 49, at 491.
125 Cheryl Rubenstein, Note, Legislating Religious Liberty Locally: The Possibility of Compelling
Conflicts, 19 REV. LITIG. 289, 321 (2000).
126 Lund, supra note 49, at 491.
127 TEx. CiV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.011 (West 2011); Lund, supra note 49, at 492.
121 § 110.011(a).
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outcomes of these contentious cases in courts have not been consistent. 29 Why do
courts resolve the clash between civil rights and religious freedom legislation so
unpredictably? It boils down to the application of the compelling interest strict
scrutiny standard of review.13 °
Some courts have ruled that civil rights legislation itself serves a compelling
state interest, while others have decided that civil rights laws do not serve a
compelling state goal and must give way in favor of religious freedom.' Some state
and federal courts applying the compelling interest test to state RFRA claims have
looked to national antidiscrimination laws to determine what legislation serves a
compelling government interest.12 Others have looked to the state and local
antidiscrimination laws to make this determination.3  Whether the court looks to
federal or state antidiscrimination laws can greatly affect the outcome of a case.13 4
Generally, federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, national origin,
sex, and color. 3 ' While federal antidiscrimination laws are rather limited in their
scope, state and local antidiscrimination laws cover a much wider breadth of
personal characteristics including "age, military status, marital status, pregnancy,
parenthood or custody of a minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental
disability, sexual orientation, religion, status with regard to public assistance,
weight, and genetic predisposition or carrier status."'36 The disparity of protection
between federal and state law for various individuals and groups with certain traits
results in heightened vulnerability for those individuals and groups who receive
only state protection, as they are more likely to be subject to discrimination under
state RFRA free exercise claims. 37
A relatively recent case decided by the Ninth Circuit, Thomas v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Commission,13' illustrates the problem that the gap between federal
and state antidiscrimination statutes can create. 139 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Commission did not involve a state RFRA but it did involve a free exercise
claim, and it shows the types of issues that arise when a court must decide which
129 Jack S. Vaitayanonta, Note, In State Legislatures We Trust?: The "Compelling Interest"
Presumption and Religious Free Exercise Challenges to State Civil Rights Laws, 101 COLUM. L. REv.
886, 888 (2001).
130 See id. at 904-12.
131 Id. at 888.
132 See Rubenstein, supra note 125, at 310-12 (citing McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723
(Mich. 1998)).
133 See id. at 310-14.
134 See id. at 10-12; Vaitayanonta, supra note 129, at 908-10.
135 Vaitayanonta, supra note 129, at 908.
136 Id. at 908-09.
137 Id. at 910.
131 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated en banc, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
139 In Thomas, the court held that the conduct of the plaintiff landlords, whose religious beliefs
prevented them from renting to unmarried, cohabitating couples, fit squarely within the terms of
Alaska's antidiscrimination laws, but that Alaska's laws may not be enforced as a matter of constitutional
law. Id.; see also Rubenstein, supra note 125, at 312-16 (explaining the significance of Thomas).
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should prevail: one person's civil right or another's free exercise of religion. 4 ° In
this case, the plaintiffs were Christian landlords whose religious beliefs prevented
them from renting to unmarried, cohabitating couples because they believed such
an arrangement was sinful. 4' Furthermore, the plaintiffs believed that facilitating
cohabitation of unmarried couples in any way was "tantamount to facilitating
sin. " 142 Plaintiffs' religious beliefs and their refusal to rent to unmarried,
cohabitating couples came into direct conflict with Alaska state law and a local
Anchorage ordinance that outlawed discrimination in rental housing based on
marital status. 143 A Ninth Circuit panel heard the case and found that the state's
interest in preventing discrimination based on marital status was not a compelling
government interest. 144 However, later, the Ninth Circuit in an en banc opinion
dismissed the case on the procedural issues of ripeness and standing.'
41
Though the Ninth Circuit eventually dismissed the case on procedural grounds,
the panel's initial determination provides an example of the precarious position of
state civil rights legislation when it is in conflict with a free exercise or state RFRA
claim. 146 The Ninth Circuit panel found that the plaintiffs claim involved "hybrid-
rights" and that the state and local governments' antidiscrimination laws
"substantially burden[ed]" those rights and therefore applied a compelling interest
strict scrutiny standard of review. 1
47
In the Ninth Circuit panel's compelling interest analysis of whether Alaska's
interest in preventing discrimination on the basis of marital status was sufficiently
compelling, it looked to the U.S. Supreme Court's determinations of when the
federal government's interest was sufficiently compelling to allow infringement
upon one's right to free exercise." 4' The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
had only recognized a compelling government interest in cases involving
antidiscrimination legislation aimed at racial and gender discrimination. 149 The
Ninth Circuit applied a national standard instead of a local one,' and it stated that
it would be "strange to reference Alaska law (in isolation) as evidence of a
compelling government interest.""' The court favored a national standard over a
local standard and handily dismissed the idea that it should give deference to or
view state antidiscrimination legislation in isolation from federal legislation and
'" Thomas, 165 F.3d at 696-97.
141 Id. at 696.
142 Id.
141 Id. at 697.
" Id. at 714-17.
145 Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1137, 1142 (9th Cit. 2000).
" See generally Thomas, 165 F.3d at 714-717 (holding that Alaska's interest in preventing
discrimination on the basis of marital status was not a compelling governmental interest, and Alaska's
antidiscrimination laws are therefore unconstitutional).
141 Id. at 711-12, 714.
141 Id. at 714-16.
149 Id. at 714-15.
1SO See id. at 714-17.
151 Id. at 716.
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U.S. Supreme Court decisions when determining whether there is a compelling
government interest. 152 In effect, the state interest will rarely fare well in situations
where a national standard is applied because national antidiscrimination legislation
is narrow in scope and the federal judiciary's decisions in favor of a compelling
government interest are even narrower.
In response to concerns about the disparity in scope between state and federal
civil rights legislation and courts' application of the compelling interest strict
standard of review, legal thinkers have proposed various solutions."5 3 One proposed
solution is that courts should "adopt a legal presumption that a neutral and
generally applicable state civil rights law serves a state's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination" when they are challenged under a state RFRA or free
exercise grounds.'54 Another possible solution is to create guidelines for courts to
follow in determining whether a state government's interest is compelling or not.'
This solution would help prevent courts from taking on "the role of unguided
policy-makers."5 6 While these suggested remedies would help to safeguard civil
rights legislation, they would not guarantee insulation of civil rights from
usurpation by state RFRA and free exercise claims. These solutions would
therefore not effectively dispel the fears of those who opposed HB 279.
In order to ensure that state and local civil rights legislation remains intact, the
best solution is to create a carve-out for such legislation. Though this process will
take some time, it is important enough to warrant legislative debate and action. A
carve-out affirmatively protects civil rights legislation because it removes any
vulnerability that the legislation might have due to courts' inconsistent application
of the compelling interest strict standard of review. A carve-out is unequivocal and
consistent in contrast to judicial application of the compelling interest standard. To
ensure both Kentucky's civil rights legislation and Kentucky's Religious Freedom
Act are effective and successful, the legislature should add a carve-out to section
446.350 that isolates antidiscrimination laws from conflict with the Act.
CONCLUSION
Given the history of religious freedom legislation at the national level and in
other states, the Kentucky Religious Freedom Act will likely not have a profound
impact on religious freedom in the state without significant improvements.
However, its effectiveness in protecting religious freedom can be enhanced by a
statutory definition of the term substantial burden, and its potential negative
impact on civil rights can be mitigated through the inclusion of a carve-out for civil
rights legislation. Together these enhancements will make a profound impact on
152 See id. at 716-17.
153 Rubenstein, supra note 125, at 316-17; Vaitayanonta, supra note 129, at 912.
154 Vaitayanonta, supra note 129, at 912.
155 Rubenstein, supra note 125, at 316-17.
156 Id. at 316.
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the future of Kentucky civil and religious rights and will assist in achieving the
initial goals of the Kentucky Religious Freedom Act.

